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BOOK REVIEWS
making power in the appellate
court regarding appeal practices.
Certainly the Court is cognizant
of the evils and in a position more
readily to correct them than is the
legislative branch of the government.
Several times the suggestion is
made that sentencing might be
made a specialized activity in the
administration of criminal justice
and entrusted to what the authorcalls a Disposition Tribunal (pp.
277, 293, 297). The personnel and
their qualifications, and the method
of functioning of this suggested
tribunal is unfortunately left to the
imagination of the reader. One may
suspect that the writer is merely
echoing the views of some psychiatrists or criminologists who
have not thought thrbugh the difficulties that surely will be encountered in attempting to integrate
such a tribunal into existing judicial organization. This inchoate
notion may have merit. Whether it
does or does not remains for further elucidation. Some readers may
regard the last two chapters as
partly repetitious. Such claim
would have to be admitted. But
it would seem that a complete justification can be pleaded by stating
that the intricacy of the varied
rules of criminal appellate procedure in so many different jurisdictions and courts sufficiently
warrants such repitition as occurs
in the interest of effective summation.
The book is indexed with the
same care and thoroughness which
permeates this excellent treatise. It
will undoubtedly do much to further the improvement of criminal
appeals in America.
ADoLPH LADRU JENsEN.
University of Utah School of Law.
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PUMSMIENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

By Georg Rusche and Otto
Kirchheimer. New York: Co4lnbia Univ. Press, 1939. Pp. vii
+268. $3.00.
The announced objective of this
book is study of "the sociology of
penal systems"; somewhat more
broadly, to bring penal methods
into meaningful relations with the
whole social and economic system.
In pursuance of this end, the authors select a number of special
problems which they subject to historical and sociological treatment.
The period covered is from the later
Middle Ages to and including contemporary times. The methods of
penal treatment discussed in detail
are fines, the galley, transportation,
and imprisonment.
A more potentially fruitful project for research than that undertaken by these authors would
hardly be desired. And the authors
have marshalled a mass of highly
significant data. Moreover, their
discussion abounds in numerous
acute observations: as to the effect
of mutilation on subsequent employment (20), that "Cruelty itself
is a social phenomenon" (23), the
implementation of the thought
that the living standards of the
lowest classes determine prison
conditions (106, 108), the influence
of trade union pressure on prison
employment (152), the conditions
of the labor market and the chances
of rehabilitation (158), the imposition of fines and unemployment
(171), that in cases of prostitution,
the fine amounts to a licensing system (175), and numerous others
that show insight and.awareness of
the implications of penal practices
and deficiencies.
But despite the importance of
the thesis, abundant descriptive

972
data, and many acute observations,
the study falls far short of being
an important contribution to our
present knowledge. For it becomes
rather quickly apparent that the
authors' "social situation," and
"historical-sociological analysis of
penal methods" simmer down to
,.economic" influence-and "economic" becomes sometimes the
conditions of the labor market, occasionally methods of production,
often the bias of dominant economic classes-usually the bourgeoisie. As a consequence it is
impossible to determine just what
their thesis is. The most persistent
current of their debate suggests,
but never explicitly, Marxist determinism. In light of their avowed
purpose, one expects consideration
of a manifold of social data (which
would seem to include legal sanctions, moral ideas and public opinion); instead one finds a particularistic ideology which leaves the
authors open to serious criticism.
Even less successful are the
methods of analysis. Interrelation
of phenomena requires rigorous
marking of boundaries and materials. It calls for definite but
justifiable restrictions of theses
maintained. Lack of analysis of
method, especially where significant interrelation of phenomena is
sought, results in a muddled description, all the more vitiated by
suspicion that the authors' economic predilection has added bias
in choice of data to lack of intelligible reconstruction of the social
situations that form the context of
change in penal systems. Thus,
with reference to early English law,
we are told: "The inability of lower-class evildoers to pay fines in
money led to the substitution of
corporal punishment in their case."
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(9) The fact is that certain crimes,
e.g., treason, could not be paid for
by anyone and that increasingly
through the later Middle Ages,
more and more offenses were made
non-clergable (a factor ignored
entirely) and seriously punished
regardless of who the offender was.
We are told repeatedly of special
hardships imposed on the poor.
But Britton and other mediaevilists inform us that hunger was a
complete defense of theft for consumption, thus revealing in some
regards a humanity greater than
our own. To cite another of the
many particularistic exaggerations,
we are informed with reference to
late 18th century English law,
that "Since the personal liberty of
of the upper classes was fully
recognized by the existing law, reform could benefit only the common people and the movement for
greater leniency faced strong resistence." (80) But leniency did
come, and abundantly! And certainly without any accompanying
loss of power by the bourgeoisie.
The authors are typically silent as
to the causes of such amelioration.
This singlemindedness makes it
impossible for them to understand
the revolt of humanitarians against
solitary confinement when its results became known. In like vein
is the argument that "the reformation of convicts is thus regarded
as a good investment" (144). They
assert that statistics show that foreigners have a higher crime rate:
"since the bulk of this group comes
from the poorest elements of society, we have clear proof of the
impact of an unfavorable economic
position on 'criminality."
(152)
This neglect of such well-known
publications as the Wickersham
Crime Reports is not surprising in
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light of the authors' unfamiliarity
with American works dealing precisely with their own problem.
"Money had become the measure
of all things" (168)-this of France
in the early 19th century! The
effort in the last chapter to establish that severity of punishment
has not affected the crime rate
rests upon fragmentary statistics
which add little, if anything, to
whatever insight or opinion one
already has concerning this matter.
This book has a scholarly Foreword by Thorstein Sellin. If only
its discriminating observations had
been available to the authors at
the inception of their work!
JEROME HALL.

Indiana University.

PRINCIPLES OF CRIrMINOLOGY. By
Edwin H. Sutherland. Chicago:
J. B. Lippincott, 1939. Pp. vii651. $3.50.
What distinguishes the new edition of Sutherland's "Criminology"
from earlier editions is the more
elaborate statement of the theoretical basis on which Prof. Sutherland has analyzed the wealth of
material he has assembled. In his
earlier editions Sutherland had
already shown-and publications
between the second and third editions have confirmed-that a theory
of criminology cannot be founded
on a biological, physiological, or
psychiatric approach. The emphasis in the present attempt to build
up a theory of criminal behavior
rests on two constant factors: 1)
the frequency and consistency of
criminal contacts specific to the
group of the prospective delinquent, 2) cultural conflict and
basic social disorganization. This

emphasis on the group factor is
elaborated in a wholly new chapter dealing with "behavior systems
in crime."
As in his earlier editions, Professor Sutherland is reluctant to
offer a general definition of crime.
It seems to me, however, that his
recognition of social disorganization as a basic cause of criminal
behavior readily opens the way for
a definition of crime itself. In fact,
his whole analysis rests on a basic
conception of the nature of crime,
particularly evident in his treatment of so-called "white collar
crimes" which constitutes a distinct feature of our culture and
receives the special emphasis it
deserves. Many white collar criminals escape punishment for one or
more of the following reasons:
1) if a statute makes a specific act
punishable but the delinquent is
powerful enough to prevent the
authorities from encroaching upon
his activities; 2) the behavior code
of the group to which the delinquent belongs does not acknowledge the culpability of certain types
of activity; and/or 3) the general
public does not judge these activities as wrong.
Nevertheless, Professor Sutherland obviously believes that "white
collar crimes" do more harm to
society and are more criminal in
their very essence than most of the
crimes prosecuted by the widely
publicized Messrs. Hoover and
Dewey.
Sutherland correctly stresses the
subjectivity of group evaluation
and therefore rejects Sellin's notion
of conduct norms as the dominant
elements in the search for a definition of crime. His own conception,
apparent throughout his treatment
of numerous detailed problems,

